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1.

STATEMENT OF CASE

A.

Nature of Case

As stated in Brief of Respondents Kootenai County, this case concerns the denial
of an application for approval of a proposed planned unit development (PUD) and
preliminary approval of a proposed subdivision known as "Chateau de Loire" by the
Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. (BOCC)

B.

Course of Proceedinas

IntervenorIRespondents adopt by reference the Course of Proceedings set forth
at pages 2 through 6 of the Brief of Respondents Kootenai county.'

C.

Statement of Facts

IntervenorslRespondents accept the Concise Statement of Facts in the Brief of
Respondents Kootenai County (pp. 1 - 2). However, lntervenorslRespondents make
this additional supplemental recitation of facts
At the public hearing before the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners on
November 19, 2007, substantive reasons for rejection of the Kirk-Hughes Development
(KHD) application for a planned unit development of more than 500 units on 578 acres
were presented. These reasons, which to a major degree were never effectively
challenged, provided part of the grounds for the rejection by the BOCC of the
application.

Appellant's Opening Brief did not follow the format specified in Idaho Appellate Rule 35 (a) (3) which
reads as follows: "Statement of Case. (i) A statement of the case indicating briefly the nature of the case.
(ii) The course of the proceedings in the trial or the hearing below and its disposition. (iii) A concise
statement of the facts." (iv) Appellant's Opening Brief, "I. Statement of the Case" is then followed with
six pages devoted largely to identifying lssues and making argument more properly belong under "(4)
lssues Presented on Appeal" and "(6) Argument." There are a few references to what may be facts and
no citations to the transcript or the record.

The KHD property is served by the East Side Fire District, a volunteer
department. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 225, L. 8 - 11. All volunteer fire districts and the volunteer
ambulance services need and are waiting for adequate money, manpower and
equipment.
Jai Nelson testified to her personal experience as a resident and adjacent owner
to Black Rock, a major second home development on the west side of Coeur d'Alene
Lake. People who pay up to or beyond a million dollars for a second or third home to
occupy intermittently according to season and other choices, do not become volunteers
in the fire district or ambulance drivers. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 282, L. 2 - 25; p. 283, L. 1 - 16.
The first hand knowledge and experience concerning both the East Side Fire
n c ~ Services (EMS) came from Rachel Wichman. Tr., Vol. 2,
District ~ m e r ~ e Medical
p. 222, L. 2 - 25; p. 223, L. 1 - 25; p. 224 L. 1 - 25; p. 225, L. 1 - 25; p. 226, L. 1 - 24.
As of the November of 2007, the East Side Fire District was charged with
protecting "about 1,500 homes and 500 other structures." & p. 222, L. 13 - 24. The
District had formed a quick response medical unit which had seen an increase in calls
which Ms. Wichman attributed to increased development.

Id.,p. 223, L. 3 - 1I;p. 224,

L. 19 -25; p. 225, L. 1 - 3.
The District had a total of 29 volunteers including both firefighters and EMT's.
Ms. Wichman told the commissioners that the District was totally dependent for
volunteers upon full-time residents who are able to provide year round service.
226, L. 8 - 12.
and the District:

p.

Rachel Wichman listed the areas of disagreement between KHD

1.

The District sought immediate conveyance of one acre of land for a
building and related facilities; KHD would only agree to deferred
conveyance after half of the lots had been sold. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 223, L. 12 -

2.

The District sought an immediate $500,000 performance bond for
construction of the fire station and facilities. KHD refused. Id. p. 223, L. 18

3.

What KHD had categorized as a trail to the lake in its plan as presented,
the District deemed to be a road that ". . . needs to meet all emergency
vehicle standards" which it presently did not.

p. 223, L. 23 - 25

All three commissioners were cognizant of the objections raised on behalf of the
fire district.

BY

CHAIRMAN CURRIE: Commissioner Tondee, I do have a couple
comments in reference to the fire protection district. This is a volunteer
organization and to add this facility onto their, should we say, their case
load and because the nature of this development, I would be surprised
you would see any volunteer coming from the ownership of the facility.
Yet, the fire district is required to protect it.

BY

...

COMMISSIONER PIAZZA:
we rely on our fire protection and even
some of our EMS as volunteers. As we get further and further and further
out in the County, we are having a harder and harder and harder time. We
meet with our fire districts regularly and they are complaining now that
they are having trouble attracting volunteers.

BY COMMISSIONER TONDEE: I agree with the emergency services. The
applicant tried to address the fire mitigation by supplying fire station but
that doesn't get the people there to do it and I think right now they are, they
do not have any emergency services on that side, they all come from Coeur
d'Alene. So, that that is a big concern for me.

District Supervisor John Pancrantz of the East Side Highway District on August

14, 2007 wrote a four-page letter to Kootenai County. The first three pages were
technical comments, but the fourth page was entirely in opposition in criticizing the
traffic report prepared for KHD:

The traffic study covers the construction traffic that will be necessary for
this development very briefly. The number of workers and the number of
heavy construction trucks is not included. A statement is made that
construction trucking will be eliminated during peak traffic times. It is not
just the peak hour traffic that is impacted by this development. The
number of trucks using SH97, especially on the Beauty Bay Hill, does
impact the safety of local traffic and does consume vehicle trips, which
results in the loss of life of the existing road structure.
The traffic study authors seem to believe that i f traffic from the
development does not exceed LOS (Level of Services) C in 2022, no impact
on the road capacity has occurred. The report states that the directional
capacity of SH 97 is 750 vehicles in each direction. This is calculated from
the Highway Capacity Manual with reductions for existing road and terrain
features. The report states the expected volume with this development,
existing traffic, growth of existing traffic, and traffic from approved
developments will be 641 vehicles in the peak direction. Given that all
assumptions made are accurate, what would happen if the following
considerations were added to this information?

*
*

*
*

Consider the Beauty Bay Hill as the limiting road segment
Do not use 3 - t o 5.99 feet shoulders as reported in the traffic study
Consider what happens to traffic flow in the winter
Consider the capacity of the 1-90 off ramp or the merge lane
onto 1-90

Who is responsible for replacing the capacity that this development has
consumed from the SH 97 corridor? The narrative stated this development
will participate in safety upgrades and studies for SH97 through a "per lot"
extraction fee requested by the KMPO. No mention of replacing the lost
capacity on SH 97 is made in the traffic study or the project narrative. As
the capacity is used, the LOS drops to undesirable levels and drivers take
unsafe risks. These risks impact the local traffic from Highway District
roads as well as the State Highway traffic. East Side Highway proposes to
join ITD in review and comment on the capacity of SH97. East Side
Highway District may also be the only agency that can accept fees in lieu of
construction for safety or capacity work on adjacent or access roads that
lead to his development.
Agency Record (ROA) 2512.

Opponents of Chateau gave up their testifying time to Pat Kelly. ". . . a degreed
engineer with 38 years of engineering experience. . ." Tr., Vol. 2, p. 230, L. 21 - 25. In
15 pages of reported testimony on November 19, 2007, Engineer Kelly dissected the
TRANSPO Report paid for by KHD.
The earlier approved Gozzer Ranch Development had resulted in 40 gravel
trucks per hour being counted in July of 2006. Engineer Kelly matched the gravel truck
number to 288 passenger vehicles per hour on the steep Beauty Bay Hill. Tr., Vol. 2, p.
234. L. 2 - 7.
Engineer Kelly faulted the TRANSPO study for treating its estimate 750 vehicles
per hour increase as acceptable without recognizing that the Beauty Bay Hill was not

". . .rolling terrain and medium width shoulders."
,.dI p. 235, L. 5 - 16. According to
Engineer Kelly, the Chateau de Loire development as per the TRANSPO study ". . . will
consume 40% of Highway 97 capacity during the afternoon peak hour "resulting in
Highway 97 being 'at 160% of capacity.

Id.,p. 235, L. 16 - 20

Engineer Kelly noted ". . .that the KMPO Highway 97 accident map identifies the
Beauty Bay climb and the passing lane as having the highest accident density of any
section between 1-90 and Harrison." Id., p. 237, L. 11 - 13
Engineer Kelly's 14 pages of testimony may be summarized in his words:
In the March 2006 Hearing Examiner's report for this development, the staff
notes state adding capacity is not feasible. The development will push
Highway 97 traffic beyond its capacity and adversely impact the safety of
East side residents. Rejecting the PUD is the one and only opportunity to
avert a traffic crisis. Once overcrowded, it is overcrowded forever.

Bev Twillmann, a full-time resident along Highway 97 area, inserted in the record
a letter from Gary Young of Idaho Transportation Department in Boise who oversees
the Scenic Highway designations, which included Highway 97.

The letter dated

October 9, 2007 corrected his earlier letter solicited by Geraldine Kirk-Hughes which
had misrepresented the facts. Gary Young's most current letter stated that:

. . .I quote I would like to take a moment and state unequivocally that any
large development along the scenic byway is detrimental to the value of the
scenic byway and the quality of life for those who live along the byway.
Unquote. Id., p. 247, L. 15 - 28. Exhibit B - 1007.
Bill Lampard, a nearby resident and constant user of Highway 97 and with a
degree in engineering, gave to the BOCC detailed first hand counts of traffic and use on
Highway 97 showing today's over-use of that highway and total absence in the future for
increasing capacity. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 275, L. 21 - 25; p. 276, L. I- 25; p. 277, L. 1- 18.
Again, the impact on Highway 97 was a major concern to the commissioners.

.

.

By CHAIRMAN CURRIE:
. I am going to agree with the Hearing
Examiner. I agree fully with her comments. I have major concerns with
. .
Highway 97 and what happens to 97 in the future.

.

By COMMISSIONER PIAZZA: The highway is another issue that there are
1500 homes out there right now the possibility of another 4500 just with the
existing parcels. So I would like to see a more comprehensive study and I
guess I just cannot see adding more traffic out there. I also go along with
the hearing examiner. Denial on the project.
Tr., Voi. 3, p. 415, L. 9 - 15.

Gary Young from ITD in Boise is not the Gary Young who was the Hearing Examiner recommending
approval in 2006 and who was hired by KHD to make its presentation at the 2007 hearings before the
hearing examiner and the BOCC.
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In her testimony, Jai Nelson made reference to a recent letter from Lynn Borders
who had commented upon a similar large project on the southwest side of Coeur
d'Alene Lake which was placed in the agency file in this case:
Lynn Borders, Chief Officer of Kootenai County Emergency Medical
Services Response recently sent a letter to Building and Planning
commenting on another large project on the southwest of the lake. In his
letter, Mr. Borders documented that current emergency medical services
would be unable t o adequately provide services to that project i n a timely
manner and a level of service that would be required for the project
residents and future growth in the area. The emergency medical services
for the Chateau development will need to come from the City of Coeur
d'Alene. Regarding this project which is a significantly larger than the
I feel there should be a huge concern for
previously mentioned project.
the time for the emergency medical services to the project area for needed
assistance.

..

Tr., Vol. 2, p. 282, L. I I

- 25, R.,p. 2508.

Again, the commissioners recognized the medical service problem identified by
Lynn Borders:
BY CHAIRMAN CURRIE: Commissioner Tondee, I do have a couple
comments in reference to the fire protection district. This is a volunteer
organization and to add this facility onto their, should we say, their case
load and because the nature of this development, I would be surprised you
would see any volunteers coming from the ownership of the facility. Yet,
the fire district is required to protect it. Emergency services, I live in Coeur
d'Alene and I pay my taxes and I expect to get emergency services very
quick. Somebody else whether it is Harrison or Spirit Lake or Worley, it
does not matter, they pay the same levy rate that I do and they have the
right to demand those same services at the same time element. And we
just can't do it. We don't have those capabilities. These are concerns and
we.. .have to take into consideration.
Tr., Vol. 3, p. 417,L. 14 - 25; p. 418,L. 1 - 3.
BY COMMISSIONER PIAZZA: I'm commenting on Mr. Currie's statement on
emergency services
.is a vital part of the County and we rely on our fire
protection and even some of our EMS to as volunteers.
. . as we get
further and further and further out i n the County, we are having a harder
and harder and harder time.

..

Tr., Vol. 3, p. 418,L. 5 - 10.

.

BY COMMISSIONER TONDEE: I agree with the emergency services. The
Applicant tried to address the fire mitigation by supplying a . . fire station
but that doesn't get the people there to do it and I think right n o w . . . they
do not have any emergency services on that side, they all come from Coeur
d'Alene. So, that that is a big concern for me.

.

Tr., Vol. 3, p. 418, L. 22 - 25; p. 419, L. 1- 2.
Full-time resident Susan Melka had done some calculations based on KHD's
plans with the purpose of determining the additional impervious surface that would'be
created by full development of Chateau de Loire. Ms. Melka stated that the area being
purchased by KHD is within what the Comprehensive Plan had designated as a
Hazardous Area and in the largest watershed on the east side of Coeur d'Alene Lake
characterized by steep grades that fall within a surface water overlay in the
Comprehensive Plan. These were the calculations of Ms. Melka:

There (sic their) proposed 500 living units at Chateau de Loire could very
possibly contribute an average of 10,000 square feet each of impervious
surface between roof area, decks and driveways. That's five million square
feet or 115 acres of absorption removed from the stormwater situation.
The average golf course adds another five acres of impervious surface for
cart and footpaths and parking areas while an area of turf grass with its
shallow roots produces three times as much runoff as an area planted with
deep rooted grasses and plants. Each mile of 20 foot wide subdivision
quality roadbed would add another 2.4 acres to this total. Right there,
that's a minimum of 140 acres out of the total available. Add to this
number, tennis courts, amphitheater, athletic facilities, clubhouse, spa, etc.
and you're quickly losing places for this water t o go. The resultant
complications caused by unstable highly erodible soils and a huge
watershed that has lost much of its ability to flow naturally quite possibly
much more i n this area including Lake Coeur d'Alene itself can bear. A
recent study done in Illinois found that increasing impervious surface as
little as ten to twenty percent can increase the amount of runoff by 100%.
That's a frightening proposition indeed.

There was testimony of downhill resident, Romer Brown, about the potential
pollution into the creek through his property into the lake. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 307, L. 1 - 25.

There was testimony before the BOCC stating that the proposed artificially
created wetlands to replace lost wetlands according to U.S. government studies will
never duplicate the benefits of existing wetlands. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 309, L. 9 - 25.
Commissioner Piazza asked that question of Kirk-Hughes development expert Tom
Duebendorfer at the close of hearing and received a less than satisfactory answer:
BY COMMISSIONER
PIAZZA:

BY TOM
DUEBENDORFER:

Wetlands in their natural seem to perform better than
when man tries to supplement. You are telling me that
man can actually make a better wetland?
This is a very -- uh, you are asking me to make a
qualitative judgment on what is a better wetland. I
mentioned only an increase in hydrologic duration.
So the wetlands in the center of the property perform
biofilteration they probably perform some amphibian
or (inaudible) production because of the shallow flowing
like this so there is some biologic use of those wetlands
but they are no means the same as a longer duration
pond or a seer swamp or a seep coming out of the side
of the hill. What I am saying is a wetland -- a wetland
could be constructed in that low lying area that will be a
higher quality than those which presently are. It's
difficult to replicate a hillside seep or a seer swamp.

--

Commissioner Piazza was not satisfied with the wetlands treatment proposed by KHD:
BY COMMISSIONER
PIAZZA:
The other issue I have it with the wetlands. We also had
another project that came through here and we held fast
on developed wetlands and not allowing on those to be
moved, the existing ones and they should work around
those. And I am really really hard fast on that. I believe
those wetlands are there for a purpose and they should
be, they should be left there and we should work around
those areas those areas.

In the Order of Decision entered December 20, 2007, the BOCC made reference
to the individuals identified above as testifying, Rachel Wichman, p. 4; Patrick Kelly, p.

5; Bill Lampard, p. 5; Bev Twillmann, p. 6; Susan Melka, p. 6. R., Vol. Ill, pp. 559 - 561.
The Comprehensive Analysis in the Order of Decision reflects acceptance of the
objections as set forth above, 4.02 Hazardous Areas; 4.03 Private Property Rights Land
Use; 4.04 Population; 4.07 Transportation, Public Services and Utilities, 4.12 Future
Land Use Maps. R., Vol. Ill, pp. 576 - 580.
The Board Analysis and Conclusions and Order of Decision are specific detailed
and reflect to a considerable degree what is set forth above. R., Vol. Ill, pp. 581 - 583.
Appellant's Opening Brief argues:
I'

. .

.that the BOCC was swayed by the large numbers of the public who
attended the hearings and requested that the applications be denied on the
basis that the use was not compatible with the area, regardless of the
zoning on the property.

Opening Brief, p. 43.
To the contrary, the transcript of the hearing on November 19, 2007, reflects the
usual generosity of time allocated to the applicant and the time limitation (three minutes)
upon opponents. KHD testimony commences at page 153 going through page 181,
followed by 20 individuals speaking in favor and 18 in favor, but not wishing to speak
(some do anyway). Pages 181 to 224.
Those in opposition, which included some neutral, had testimony from pages
225 to 326. KHD had rebuttal from pages 327 to 354. That comes to 98 pages of
testimony in favor and 101 pages in opposition. In numbers of testifying persons, 20
were in favor plus representatives of KHD and 34 were opposed. There is nothing to
support the allegation of BOCC being swayed by large numbers. The testimony was
evenly balanced. The applicant far outweighed opponents with introduced exhibits.
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II.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Are the Memorandum Opinion and Order in re: Appeal of Decision by

Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners and the Amended Memorandum
Opinion and Order in re: Appeal of Decision by Kootenai County Board of County
Commissioners entered by District Judge John Patrick Luster supported by substantial
and competent evidence and by statutory and appellate case authority?

2.

Did District Judge Luster in his Memorandum Opinions properly defer to

the findings of fact of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners as binding upon the
reviewing Court giving the requisite presumption favoring validity of zoning boards?

3.

Did the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners treat the Kootenai

County Comprehensive Plan as a guide and advice for making zoning decisions and
take into account the goals of the Comprehensive Plan in light of present factual
circumstances surrounding the application of KHD for a planned unit development and
subdivision?

4.

Does the appeal of Kirk-Hughes Development only invite the appellate

court to second guess the district court on conflicting evidence presented to the
Kootenai County Board of Commissioners?

Ill.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standards governing judicial review in a case involving the LLUPA
(Local Land Use Planning Act) provide that this Court:
"does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of
the evidence presented. I.C. 367-5279). Rather, this Court defers to the
agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Price, 131
ldaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 588 (citing Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 ldaho
923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262 (1998) (citing South Fork Coalition v. Board o f
CommJrs o f Bonneville Counfy, 117 ldaho 857, 860, 792 P.2d 882, 885
(1990)). 'In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding
on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the

agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial
competent evidence in the record.' Id.
"The Board's zoning decision may only be overturned where its findings;
(a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's
statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure: (d) are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing I.C. §67-5279(3) ). The
party attacking the Board's decision must first show that the Board erred in
a manner specified in ldaho Code 567-5279(3), and then it must show that
its substantial right has been prejudiced. Id. (citing Angstman v. City o f
Boise, 128 ldaho 575,578, 917 P.2d 409,412 (Ct. App. 1996)."
Friends o f Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 ldaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9,
13 (2002).
Fischer v. City of Kefchum, 141 ldaho 349, 352 - 353, 109 P.3d 1091,

(2005).
IV.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous and the agency's factual determinations are binding on the
reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency,
so long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record.
South Fork Coalition v. Board o f Comm'rs o f Bonneville County, 117 ldaho
857, 860, 792 P.2d 882, 885 (1990). Additionally, there is a strong
presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning boards, which
includes the application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances.
Howard v. Canyon County Bd. o f Comm'rs, 128 ldaho 479, 480, 915 P.2d
709 711 (1996).
Payefte River Properfy Owners Association v. Board of Counfy Commissioners
of Valley County, 132 ldaho 551, 554, 976 P.2d 477, -(1999).

Our holding that "in accordance with" does not require that governing
bodies, as a matter of law, zone their land as it appears on their land use
maps does not mean that such bodies can ignore their comprehensive
plans when adopting or amending zoning ordinances. Section 67-6511
requires governing bodies to zone in accordance with their comprehensive
plan. We hold that "in accordance with" is a question of fact. What a
governing body charged to zone "in accordance with" under $567-6511 must

do is make a factual inquiry into whether the requested zoning ordinance
or amendment reflects the goals of, and takes into account those factors
in, the comprehensive plan in light of the present circumstances
surrounding the request.
Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 ldaho 844, 850, 693 P.2d 1046,

This Court defers to the Board of Commissioner's findings of fact unless
the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Evans, 137 ldaho at 431, 50 P.3d
at 446; Friends o f Farm to Market, 137 ldaho at 196, 46 P.3d at 13. The
Board of Commissioners' factual findings are not clearly erroneous so long
as they are supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting,
evidence. Friends o f Farm to Market, 137 ldaho a t 196,46 P.3d at 13.
Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, -(2003).

IV.
Respondents seek an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to ldaho
Code 912-121. They can be awarded attorney fees under that statute only i f
the appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 ldaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002). An award of
attorney fees is appropriate if the appellant simply invites the appellate
court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence. Id. That is all
that this appeal has sought. It asks us to second-guess the trial court on
conflicting evidence. The Respondents are entitled to an award of attorney
fees on appeal pursuant to ldaho Code 912-121.
Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1057, -(2006).

V.

ARGUMENT

District Judge John Patrick Luster read the transcript and record of the Kootenai
County Planning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners, read the 14
plus briefs and memoranda submitted by the parties, heard all the oral arguments in
numerous hearings and then issued a comprehensive 27 page Memorandum Opinion
and Order on re: Appeal of Decision by Kootenai County Board of Commissioners with

a brief addition in an Amended Memorandum. R., Vol. V, pp. 1043 - 111 3 . ~The
memorandum opinions conclude:
CONCLUSION

It is concluded that the action of the Respondent BOCC must be affirmed
because it cannot be found that the findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions of the BOCC denying the applications of Appellant KHD were in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, in excess of its statutory
authority, made upon unlawful procedure, not supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole, or were not arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion as required under ldaho Code $67-5279(3). Even if the
action of the BOCC has fallen within one of the categories listed in ldaho
Code 967-5279(3), the action of the BOCC must still be affirmed because
the substantial rights of KHD have not been prejudiced. Other issues
raised by KHD have been considered herein, but they do not alter the
outcome.
R.,Vol. V, p. 1081, pp. 1111 - 1112.
All of the issues raised in Appellant's Opening Brief were made in briefs and oral
arguments before Judge Luster and were adequately disposed of in his Memorandum
. ~ fundamental premise of KHD seems to be that it was entitled
Opinion and ~ r d e r The
as a matter of right to a planned unit development and a subdivision. This premise
assumes either that there be no hearings prior to approval or that any hearing will be
pro-forma to be followed by BOCC approval regardless of what is heard in those
hearings. That is not the law in 1dah0.~ The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA)
ldaho Code §§67-6501 et. seq. and the Kootenai County Ordinances No. 401 and 344

The Record erroneously duplicates and mixes the two opinions, but includes the total of both.
Therefore, the Memorandum and the Amended Memorandum, which should total 55 pages, occupy 70
pages in the Record.
Much of Appellant's Opening Brief is devoted to argument about the first denial in 2006 and the Post Mediation
Agreement Intervenors/respondents were not lnvolvcd in those procced~ngsso no response IS made tntervenl!on
was sought to prevent another tned~at~on
ayreernent

he Appellant's Opening Brief cites eight federal case and 49 out-of-Idaho state cases. These no doubt reflect the
contribution of Professor Emeritus Robert Freilich, long-time National Editor of "The Urban Lawyer. The National
Journal on State and Local Government Law" issued quarterly through the American Bar Association. The ldaho
case law and statutes on land use are in the mainstream of American zoning, and there is no need to look to out-ofstate sources.

submitted as Appendices to Brief of Respondent Kootenai County mandate the
procedure followed by the BOCC in this case
An application for a PUD must use procedures that include notice and hearing
requirements outlined in Idaho Code 567-6512, Zoning ordinance No. 401. 9.15.1
There are 13 pages of requirements closing with conditions for approval. 9.15.2 to
9.15.9 A and B. In 9.15.9 C, the BOCC is directed to determine after hearing the

C.

Required Findings for Approval.

To approve an application for a PUD permit, the hearing body must
recommend and Board must find that the facts submitted with the
application establish that:

1.

The proposal is compatible with the goals, policies and future land
use map of Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan.

2.

The proposal is consistent with the intent and purpose of this title.
The amenities, design, and benefits of the PUD justify any requested
deviation from the normal requirements of this title. Development of
the PUD is in the best interest of the public.

3.

The application and design meet the requirements of this chapter,
other applicable sections of this title, other county ordinances, and
the requirements of other agencies.

4.

The proposed structures and uses within the PUD are compatible
with one another.

5.

The proposed development is compatible with surrounding homes,
businesses and neighborhoods, and with the natural characteristics
o f th'e area. Areas not suited for development are designated as
open space. Road construction and disturbance of the terrain,
vegetation and drainageways will be minimized and will not result in
soil erosion. Any site constraints, hazards or negative
environmental, social and economic impacts will be adequately
mitigated.

Counsel for respondent Kootenai County has been very helpful in creating Appendices which include
the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance No. 401 and the Subdivision Ordinance No. 344.
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6.

Services and facilities necessary to serve the development are
feasible, available and adequate. Any adverse effects on service
delivery by political subdivisions, will be adequately mitigated.

7.

Proposed roads, sidewalks, trails and parking facilities within the
development establish or adequately contribute to a transportation
system for vehicles, bicycles and pedestrians that is safe,
convenient, efficient and that minimizes traffic congestion.

8.

The proposal is not anticipated to result in significant degradation of
surface or ground water quality as determined by DEQ.

9.

The PUD will be held in one ownership, or there is an effective means
of control and oversight of the development in perpetuity.
Provisions for maintaining land, infrastructure and shared
improvements are adequate.

10.

I f the application is for final plan approval, any applicable conditions
of conceptual plan approval have been met.

11

Public notice and the processing of the application met the
requirements set forth in this title, County adopted hearing
procedures, and Idaho Code 967-6512

In this case the BOCC made findings in accordance with 9.15.9 (c). Similarly
Subdivision Ordinance No. 344 for a major subdivisions requires notices, hearing and a
recommendation by the hearing body determining if the application meets
"requirements." 10.2.1 c. k.
1. BOCC Properly Acted in a Quasi-Judicial Capacity in Reviewing the
Second Application of KHD filed March 14,2007.

Appellant's Opening Brief creates a strawman of legislative instead of quasijudicial discretionary review and then beats on it from page 17 through 22 and
sporadically thereafter. The transcripts of the hearings, volumes 1, 2 and 3 and all that
is in the record fully support all actions of the BOCC as being in a quasi-judicial mode,
not legislative.

The fact that Commissioner Currie had voted for denial of the first application
does not preclude him from acting in a quasi-judicial mode on the second application. it
is most common and certainly legally judicial for a trial court judge to rehear and/or retry
a case after the appellate court has reversed and remanded that trial court judge's
opinion in favor of one party and against another.
Appellant's Opening Brief cites from Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls,
159 P.3d 840, 846 (2007) the following:
"When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter the governing board is
neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue, but sits
instead in the seat of a judge."

Opening Brief, p. 18.
Appellant Turner's argument that the city council could not be impartial after
voting to review a Planning and Zoning commission decision was rejected. 144 ldaho at
209.
The above quotation is from Lowty v. Board of Counfy Commissioners for Ada
Counfy, 115 ldaho 65, 765 P.2d 431 (App. 1988). In that case, the Court of Appeals
reversed a district court decision that found the board to be a proponent. The appellate
court instead found that the board ". . .had tried to maintain a passive, non-partisan and
removed position on appeal, while at the same time trying to explain its decision below."
115 ldaho at 71.
The quote is followed in the Turnercase by quotes from Republican Parfy of
Minn. v. Whife, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002) which
recognizing that impartiality does not mandate "lack of preconception in favor or
against,"' but only willingness "to consider views that oppose his preconceptions."' 144
ldaho at 209.

The Turner opinion concludes upon this issue with the appellate and statutory
law in ldaho:

A decision maker is not disqualified simply because he has taken a
position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, in the
absence of a showing that the decision maker is 'not capable of judging a
particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances."'
Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 ldaho 780,785,86 P.3d 494,499 (2004)
(quoting from Hortonville Joint School Distr. No. I v. Hortonville Education
Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 493, 96 S. Ct. 2308, 2314, 49 L.Ed.2d 1,9 (1976).

144 ldaho at 209
2.

KHD Concedes That its Substantial Riahts Were Not Prejudiced

On pages 19 and 20 of Appellate's Opening Brief and thereafter periodically,
KHD argues that the BOCC had no discretion to deny the PUD or the subdivision
because the lots sought were fewer than those allowed in the Restricted Residential
and Rural zones. KHD cites cases in support from Indiana, New Mexico, Florida,
Connecticut, Minnesota, Delaware, Colorado and a federal case, but no ldaho cases.
The KHD argument is that because the Restricted Residential Zone (5 lots per
acre) and the Rural Zone (1 lot per acre) "allowed at least 999 residential homes on
the property" KHD was entitled to automatic approval of its PUD and subdivision
application.
While this is an unsupportable argument, it is a concession that totally negates
one essential element to KHD's case. Judge Luster concluded as a fallback in his
Memorandum Opinions that ". . . the action of the BOCC must still be affirmed because
the substantial rights of KHD have not been prejudiced." R. Vol. V, p. 1080 and pp.

I1 11-1 112. If KHD can build 999 homes, it has suffered no prejudice.
In fact the denial of KHD and the subdivision at the peak of rapid development in
Kootenai County has saved KHD millions of dollars (if it had any money). As

everywhere else in the United States, sales of second homes, beginning in 2008, have
crashed. Black Rock on the west shore of Coeur 'd Alene Lake has filed for bankruptcy.
All other big developers are financially hurting. However, there is still an active market
for single home sites at the time. 7
3.

KHD Argument: Approval Should Have Been Ministerial.

In arguing that the denial was legislative rather than quasi-judicial, KHD is taking
the position that the BOCC did not have judicial discretion to deny the application
The parallel that comes to mind is the relatively recent Quick Ticket screens at
the airports. All KHD had to do was punch in the application, identify itself, prove fee
payment, indicate destination (approval) and the necessary permits would pop out.
KHD's argument is that approval of the PUD was ministerial without review by any
supervising agency or comment by any bystander. To carry the analogy further, KHD is
carrying too much baggage, which on inspection will not allow it to proceed to approval.
Perhaps that automatic approval happened in some of the cases cited in
Appellant's Opening Brief. However, there is no need to look beyond ldaho. The
BOCC properly exercised that discretion allowed under ldaho zoning law and the
Kootenai County ordinances. See Respondent County's Appendices and pages

15-16 above for county PUD and zoning ordinances.
A fair number of reported appellate zoning cases in ldaho involve review of
district court opinions exercising discretion in approving or remanding city and county
decisions involving PUD's and subdivisions in relation to existing zones and the
Comprehensive Plans of the local government. Angstman v. Cify of Boise, 128 ldaho

7

The admission that the KHD property could right now obtain permits for 999 home sites is like an
accidental kick in a soccer game by the opponent into its own goal. The home town will cheer because
the goal (concession) counts against the opponent.
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575, 917 P.2d 409 (App. 1996). Payette River Property Owners Association v. Board of
Commissioners of Valley County, 132 ldaho 551, 976 P.2d 497 (1999). Evans v. Teton
County, 139 ldaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003).
4.

Compatibility Determination is Mandatory.

KHD argues that the BOCC erred in listening to the oral testimony and in reading
the written protests stating that the Chateau d' Loire development would be
incompatible with the surrounding area. Brief, pp. 21 - 22. KHD argues that
consideration of compatibility is illegal.
The purpose of a PUD is to allow concentration of living units perhaps including
associated golf courses, tennis courts and commercial uses. Subdivision regulations
place height limitations and require open spaces
ldaho Code 367-6513 and §§50-1301 through 50-1539 and the Kootenai County
Subdivision Ordinance specifically required the BOCC to determine if the PUD and the
subdivision would be compatible:
5.

The proposed development is compatible with surrounding homes,
businesses and neighborhoods, and with the natural characteristics
of the area.
Zoning Ordinance No. 401, 39.15.C.5

(.6.)

The proposal will contribute to orderly development of the area.
~ r o p o s e duses, design and density are compatible with existing
homes, businesses, neighborhoods, and with the natural
characteristics of the area. The subdivision will create lots of
reasonable utility and livability, which are capable of being built
upon without imposing an unreasonable burden on future owners.
Areas not suited for development are designated as open space.
(Emphasis supplied).
Kootenai County Subdivision Ordinance No. 394 (4) 10 -2-5-c (1) (k) (g).

Neither of the two ldaho cases cited in Appellant's Opening Brief, Urrufia v.
Blaine County, 134 ldaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000) nor Sanders Orchard v. Gem County

ex re1Board of County Commissioners, 137 ldaho 695, 52 P.3d 840 (2002) made any
reference to compatibility. In both cases, the boards were held to have erroneously
relied solely on their Comprehensive Plan to deny what the developers sought. 134
ldaho at 358 - 359; 137 ldaho at 699.
The BOCC was required to obey the mandates of requisite approval directions
making a fact finding as to compatibility.
The Connecticut, Missouri, Colorado, Alabama and New Jersey cases cited by
appellants, may or may not support its argument against compatibility. In any event,
these cases are not ldaho law.
In Evans v. Teton County, 139 ldaho 71, 73 p. 3084 (2002), The ldaho Supreme
reviewed a provision in the Teton County Subdivision Ordinance that set standards for
determining compatibility with the surrounding property. The Court held that the board
had properly made those calculations on compatibility that allowed approval. 139 ldaho
at 78. Compatibility is a valid concern. See also Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley
County, 137 ldaho 142, 96 P.2 (2002) where a county criteria on compatibility was
reviewed and approved. 137 ldaho at 198.
5.

BOCC Took Guidance from the Kootenai County Comprehensive
Plan.

-

KHD complains because BOCC made findings with regard to the Comprehensive
Plan Goals. The standard form in ail cases of this nature used in Kootenai County
directs the Hearing Officer or Planning Commission and the BOCC to express opinions
as to how the proposal relates to the various planning goals.
Hearing Officer Lisa Keys and the BOCC followed the format and expressed
views indicating compliance with the goals as well as identifying those portions that
appeared to be contrary to those goals. In doing so, Kootenai County was following its
21

own playbook. This practice is exactly what the ldaho Supreme Court has ruled should
be done with reference to the Comprehensive Plan.
The action of BOCC was completely following the directive of the ldaho Supreme
Court as to how the Comprehensive Plan is to be used in making zoning decisions:
Our holding is supported by a large body of case law which states that
comprehensive plans to do not themselves operate as legally controlling
zoning law, but rather serve to guide and advise the various governing
bodies responsible for making zoning decisions. See Theobold v, Board o f
County Commissioners, Summit County, 644 P.2d 942, 949 (Colo. 1982);
Barrie v. Kitsap County, 613 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Wash. 1980); Holmgren v. City
o f Lincoln, 199 Neb. 178, 256 N.W.2d 686, 690 (1977); 82 Am. Jur.2d Zoning
and Planning, 969; 3 Anderson, American Law o f Zoning 609.
Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 840, 693 P.2d 1046, -(I
984).
A comprehensive plan is not a legally controlling zoning law, it serves as a
guide to local government agencies charged with making zoning decisions.
However, a board of commissioners cannot ignore their comprehensive
plan when adopting or amending zoning ordinances.
Evans v. Tefon Counfy, supra, 135 ldaho at 77.
Again, citing four out of ldaho cases and a text, KHD makes the same argument
that BOCC had no discretion because the submitted PUD and subdivision had made
appropriate reference to sections of zoning and subdivision ordinances. KHD asserts
that the decision can only be automatic, not subject of a hearing and without discretion.
Appellant's Opening Brief. pp. 28 - 29.
6.

Appellant Ignores ldaho Law and Past Historv in This Case.

Without reviewing the cited out-of-state and federal cases nor the learned texts,
undersigned counsel has attempted to show how the denial of the BOCC was based on
discretionary allowable, i.e, even mandated by LLUPA and the Kootenai County
ordinances. It would seem that Appellant's Opening Brief ignores the decided idaho
cases, the applicable state statutes and the Kootenai County ordinances just as much
22

as Intervenors/Respondents have ignored foreign authority. Perhaps KHD is relying on
foreign law with the inteot of trying to show that the county ordinances should be
stricken. It is as if the Nevada developer were claiming the right to be judged by the
Nevada law and other cited out-of-state cases she brings with her.

That cannot be.

What may be the ultimate bizarre and off-the-wall argument in Appellant's
Opening Brief is this:
D

The District Court Failed to Give Proper Weight to the Hearing
Examiner's Recommendation for Approval." p. 29.

The supporting citation is to Pearl v. Board of Professional Discipline of ldaho
State Board of Medicine, 137 ldaho 107, 112, 44 P.3d 1162 (2002).
There is nothing in the record of the first Pearl case (made March 2, 2006) to
show that BOCC did not critically review the hearing officer's recommendation. The
final determination in the Pearl case relative to the hearing officer recites that the
decision is that of the agency, not the hearing officer.
The Board does not need to accept the hearing officer's factual
determinations. e.g. DepJtof Health and Welfare v. Sandoval, 113 ldaho 186,
190, 742 p.2d 992, 996 (Ct. app. 1987). This Court reviews the findings of
the Board, not the hearing officer, although this Court gives the Board's
decision greater scrutiny if the Board refuses to accept that hearing
officer's recommendations.

137 ldaho at 114.
However, the Hearing Officer in 2006, now spokesman for KHD, was looking at a
plan that differed from 2008. If there were any substance of KHD's argument, it should
relate to the recommendation of Hearing Officer Lisa Key for denial in 2008, which was
accepted by the BOCC
The absurdity of the KHD argument is this: Appellant is asking this Court to
reverse and remand based on the Hearing Examiner's recommendation made March 2,

The absurdity of the KHD argument is this: Appellant is asking this Court to
reverse and remand based on the Hearing Examiner's recommendation made March 2,
2006, but ignore the BOCC Order of Decision rejecting that recommendation on
December 13, 2007, ignore the recommendation of denial of Hearing Officer Lisa Key
on September 11, 2007 and ignore the BOCC Order of Decision for denial on
December 13, 2007. KHD is engaged in an extreme game of cherry picking, but in this
case that cherry has long since dried up and wilted away.

7.

Intervenors1 Respondents Entitled t o Attorney's Fees on Appeal

Attorneys' fees were not sought by IntervenorslRespondents at the trial court
level. However, lntewenorslRespondents are entitled to recover attorneys' fees
incurred on appeal on the grounds that the appeal only invites the appellate court to
second guess the trial court. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 ldaho 549,559,130 P.3d 1087
( 2 0 0 6 ) . Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746,761, 133 P.3d 1211 ___ (2006)
Gilfner Dairy L.L.C. v. Jerome Counfy, 145 ldaho 630, 634, $81 P.3d 1238, (2008). Birdwood Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc., v. Buloffi Consfrucfion,
Inc. 145 Idaho 17, 23, 175 P.3d 179, -(2007).
The law in ldaho Code 312-121 was reiterated recently in a multi-party case
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. and Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 ldaho 208, 177

However, Wilde also requested attorneys fees pursuant to I.C. §122
That section permits the award o f attorneys fees t o the!
prevailing party if the court determines the case was brought,
pursued o r defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. Nation v. State Dept. of Corrects., 144 ldaho 177,194,
158 P.3d 953, 970 (2007). We find that Commercial has pursued this
appeal frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. Therefore,
because Wilde is a prevailing party, we award him attorneys fees
pursuant t o I.C. 512-121.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners acting as a quasi-judicial
following state zoning law and Kootenai County ordinances, made a determination
supported by substantial competent evidence to deny KHD's application for a PUD and
a subdivision.
The BOCC Order of Decision is entitled to the strong presumption and validity
given by District Judge Luster. No substantial rights of KHD have been prejudiced.
lntervenorslRespondents Neighbors For Responsible Growth and Respondent
Kootenai County are entitled to attorneys fees on appeal.
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